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The Constraints of World Capitalism in Catching-Up 
 
By Jacques Hersh 
  
The aim of this paper is to discuss various aspects of the evolution of the world 
capitalist system as well as to raise general questions concerning governance 
and state capacities in the transition of late developers to market economies as 
well as the prospects of achieving economic parity with the highest developed 
capitalist countries. In terms of development this can be interpreted as attaining 
what modernization theory projected as the ultimate stage of economic activity 
in the form of the mass consumption society on the basis of the American Way 
of Life; that is the adoption of Western capitalism’s production and consumption 
patterns as well as political norms. Although this model was tailored to counter 
the development strategies of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries 
during the Cold War (Rostow 1960), it does raise some interesting issues 
concerning the present international political economy.  
 
Capitalist Development: Some Considerations 
One of the main critiques of the modernization school by the so-called 
dependency theory was based on the fact that the relationship of developing 
countries to highly developed capitalist countries was not put into question but 
considered to be entirely beneficial for the development process. In this light, 
the globalization problematique raises the issue of whether present day 
capitalism is conducive to the homogenization of economic levels of countries 
in the international system and whether states by internalizing and accepting the 
influence and rules which have emerged in the leading centers of capitalism 
stand a better or worse chance of acceding to the highest levels of economic 
development.  
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Divergent opinions and theories as to whether the international economy has 
held back or enhanced the economic development of the periphery have 
dominated the field of development studies. The empirical evidence shows that 
there has been both growth as well as decline. However, indicators of 
development show a continuing gap in the middle of the world distribution 
which is difficult to cross. In this regard it is no exaggeration to point out that 
the evolution of the capitalist world system has historically not equalized and 
harmonized economic levels between core and periphery. This axiom of 
dependency theory has recently been reconfirmed by the evidence provided by 
Angus Maddison (1995); based on a database of estimated capita income levels 
for all countries of the world since 1820, he produced the conclusion that 
income levels were much closer nearly two hundred years ago than they are 
today and that with few exceptions those countries with the highest incomes in 
1820 are the same that have the highest incomes today (Sutcliff 1999: 142). 
 
Thus in order to understand the evolution of the international system it is of 
importance to have a critical ontological point of departure concerning the 
question of whether capitalism is to be considered as a benevolent system 
leading to harmonious relationships both on the internal and external plans. If 
this is the case then the question needing an answer is whether this benevolence 
has always been inherent in the world expansion of the market or whether this is 
a new characteristic. On the other hand, if we have a different conceptual 
framework and consider capitalism as a conflictual system leading to 
polarization on both the domestic and international levels, the question becomes 
one of whether societies should protect themselves (and how) from the 
dysfunctions of world market forces. Methodologically the answer to these 
issues has to be sought in the sphere of economic history and international 
political economy. Thus it is in this context that doctrines and praxis of 
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economic nationalism and socialism have to be seen, i.e. as attempts to break the 
monopoly of development. 
 
Historically, capitalism can be considered as having been an ambivalent system: 
To the extent that it created the conditions for the development of the means of 
production and incorporation of extra-European regions of the world into the 
system it was considered to be dynamic and progressive. Especially from the 
vantagepoint of Europe. However, for what became the periphery, these areas 
became exposed to colonization, colonialism and neocolonialism: that is 
exploitation under different forms. At the same time control of innovations and 
technologies by the early developers, i.e. core capitalist countries, was crucial to 
their monopoly of economic power and maintenance of global inequality. As a 
development economist puts it, this state of affairs is not a past chapter and 
ought to be the concern of development studies: “I believe the subject of 
unequal control of key economic activities and innovations is still at the heart of 
a critical development theory:” (O’Hearn 1999: 114). 
 
Historically the contradictory nature of world capitalism was recognized by 
different schools of thought. It was basic to the conceptualization of the Marxist 
tradition. Thus the authors of The Communist Manifesto displayed an acute 
awareness of the globalizing character of capitalism due to its internal 
contradiction: “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products 
chases the bourgeoisie (i.e. modern capitalist class) over the whole surface of the 
globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions 
everywhere.” At the time, Marx and Engels considered the transformations this 
entailed in the non-European areas as a positive evolution. “In place of the old 
local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every 
direction, universal inter-dependence of nations.” (Marx and Engels 
1848/1958:37 and 38) In other writings as well, Marx expressed positive views 
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about the expansion of European capitalism in extra-European areas such as 
India and China. It was after having studied the relationship between metropoles 
and colonies (especially in the case of England’s domination of Ireland) that he 
came to realize that the colonial powers instead of unleashing local productive 
forces established obstacles to their development. This recognition opened the 
way for strategic thinking along anti-imperialist lines, which Marx expressed 
when hinting that socialism in Europe would depend on the liberation of the 
colonies from the metropoles. In an article called Revolution in China and in 
Europe he writes the following: 
 
It may seem a very strange, and a very paradoxical assertion that 
the next uprising of the people of Europe, and their next movement 
for republican freedom and economy of government, may depend 
more probably on what is now passing in the Celestial Empire, --
the very opposite of Europe, --than on any other political cause that 
now exists … (Marx and Engels n.d.: 15) 
 
“Socialism in One Country” and Nationalism 
Within the Marxist-Leninist tradition, imperialist theories emerged which not 
only propagated national liberation in the colonies but also called for rupture 
with the capitalist world system and for self-centered socialist economic 
development. In practice, however, the historical evolution was more complex. 
In the aftermath of the Russian revolution, which took place in a “backward” 
country, the Bolsheviks were not entirely of one mind concerning the 
relationship to the outside world; this led to a wavering of positions according to 
circumstances and the opportunism of leading members of the party leadership. 
But the hostility of the capitalist countries (especially the United States) played 
an important role in determining the outcome of these disputes. In concrete 
terms, the strategy of “socialism in one country” which emerged in the isolated 
Soviet Union was an attempt by Stalin to transform the external capitalist 
hostility into internal dynamism while maintaining control of anticapitalist 
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forces in the international communist movement to serve the interests of the 
USSR. As the historian E.H. Carr pointed out: “Socialism in One Country 
signified a turn towards self-reliance in economic policy and the Bolshevisation 
of the world revolutionary movement.” (Carr 1959: 56)  
 
The economic strategy toward the capitalist world became a point of contention 
in the internal power struggle which developed following the demise of Lenin. 
Under the existing circumstances, Stalin’s identification with the mood of 
isolation reduced the chances of the opposition to defeat him. In the words of 
Charles Bettelheim: “This reaffirmation of the Leninist thesis concerning the 
possibility of constructing socialism in the USSR undoubtedly helped to endow 
Stalin both inside and outside the party with a prestige enjoyed by no other 
members of the leadership.” (Bettelheim 1976: 53) In addition, latent ties to the 
intellectual and political traditions of economic nationalism and Russian 
populism probably pushed in the same direction. 
 
As is known, during the great economic capitalist crisis of the 1930s the Soviet 
Union implemented a forced industrialization by relying principally on its own 
forces; this evolution enabled the USSR to face the hardships imposed upon the 
country during the Second World War at the hands of Nazi Germany, albeit with 
half-hearted support from the United States. As a consequence of its own 
internal strength, the country was able not only to come out victorious of the 
conflict but to break out of isolation by imposing its control and social system 
on Eastern European countries. In Asia, the victory of the Chinese Revolution 
further invigorated the vision of an alternative international system to 
capitalism. In the post-World War II period, the economic recovery of the 
shattered Soviet economy and that of the other socialist countries proceeded at a 
relatively high speed. This was taking place at a time of confrontation with the 
West so the economic relations between the two blocs were rather limited. The 
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economic results were so positive that Stalin insinuated, in his last writing in 
1952, at the possibility of the socialist camp coming into a situation of 
competition with capitalism on the world market: 
 
It may confidently be said that, with the pace of industrial 
development, it will soon come to pass that these countries (the 
socialist states) will not only be in no need of imports from 
capitalist countries, but will themselves feel the necessity (my 
emphasis) of finding an outside market for their surplus products. 
(Stalin 1972: 31)   
 
The idea that export constraints due to surplus or overproduction could become 
socialist economic categories was in fact in contradiction with the Stalinist 
system’s own self-perception of “planned proportionality” as an economic “law” 
under socialism. 
 
With the spread of proto-socialist systems in Eastern Europe and in Asia, intra-
bloc tensions emerged at the expense of internationalism. Very soon, because of 
various tendencies both within the Soviet Union and the other countries, 
“socialism in one country” was not replaced by “socialism in several countries” 
but by several “socialisms in one country” (Emmanuel 1970:17) implying a high 
degree of national egoisms especially on the part of the USSR both under Stalin 
and the post-Stalin leadership. The populations of the Eastern European 
countries had not really been consulted, with socialism imposed on them from 
the outside as a result of the outcome of the Second World War as concretized in 
the Yalta Agreement. In the cases where genuine popular struggles for liberation 
and socialism had taken place, e.g. in Yugoslavia and China, discord with 
Moscow arose leading to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform and 
the Sino-Soviet split. Simultaneously, Soviet troops had to be used to put down 
a rebellion first in Eastern Germany in 1951, later an uprising in Hungary in 
1956 and the so-called Prague Spring in 1968. The course of peaceful 
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coexistence, which emerged during the Nikita Khrushchev era, further 
emphasized national egoism in the USSR and the development of international 
economic relations and its eventual reintegration in the capitalist world 
economy. This was taking place at the time when the United States was involved 
in a war in Indochina, threatening the security of Asian socialist countries 
(China, the DPRK, and Vietnam) as well as menacing Cuba. During the oil 
crisis in the 1970s, the Soviet Union became more interested in earning hard 
currency by selling to Western countries than in providing its socialist allies 
with petrol. (For a discussion of the Bolshevik view of relations to the capitalist 
world and the economic trade relations of the USSR from the seventies on, see: 
Brun and Hersh 1990)  
 
Seen in this light the demise of the state socialist system in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe can be said to have been a consequence of the inability of these 
countries to resolve the contradictions which relations to the world capitalist 
system entail. This was not only related to the economic backwardness of these 
societies but also to the shift of objectives on the part of the polity. The genuine 
political economy dichotomy revolves around the question of building socialism 
in a context of trying to adjust to external forces and influences by relying on 
economic nationalism. The case of the Soviet Union reveals the tensions and 
contradictions behind such a process. This historical experience has led some 
development theoreticians to portray the Soviet experiment as having been a 
failed attempt at catching-up to the developed capitalist nations. 
 
While Marxism has proved to be a useful theoretical tool to understand the 
dynamics of capitalist expansion which divided the societies of the world into 
divergent units according to their economic levels, the applicability of Marxist 
analysis to the practice of socialist construction has been less successful. 
Nevertheless, the experience of the strategy of “socialism in one country” in the 
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Soviet Union as well as self-reliance in China showed that economic 
development and industrialization were possible outside the realm of world 
capitalist relations. 
 
The Significance of Economic Nationalism 
The realization that having an open unprotected relationship to advanced 
capitalism was neither conducive to development nor to the evening out of 
differences between the different category nations was recognized rather early 
by another theoretical tradition of political economy, namely economic 
nationalism. The interesting aspect of this approach is that it did not reflect an 
antinomy to capitalism. Rather it was based on a realization that open economic 
relationships on the world market did not entail a positive-sum game to the 
benefit of all partners irrespective of their industrial level. In other words, free 
trade was not propitious to economic development as implicitly assumed by the 
theory of comparative advantage and the modernization school or, one might 
add the presently dominating neoliberalism, which is the ideological foundation 
of globalization. 
 
The doctrine of free trade of course originated in England after the Industrial 
Revolution and was reflection of economic superiority. But it is often forgotten 
that before adopting free trade as the basis of its economic relations with the 
outside world, England had sabotaged the potential industrial development of 
India and China, not by free trade but by limiting these nations’ cotton and silk 
exports access to its market. This had been done in order to nurture the “infant” 
industrialization of Britain. In his classic contribution “The Economic History of 
India,” Romesh Dutt (1901) wrote: 
 
It is, unfortunately, a fact, that in many ways, the sources of 
national wealth in India have been narrowed under the British rule. 
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India in the eighteenth century was a great manufacturing as well as 
a great agricultural country, and the products of the Indian loom 
supplied the markets of Asia and of Europe. It is, unfortunately, 
true that the East Indian Company and the British Parliament, 
following the selfish commercial policy of a hundred years ago, 
discouraged Indian manufacturers in the early years of British rule 
in order to encourage the rising manufacturers of England. Their 
fixed policy, pursued during the last decades of the eighthteenth 
century and the first decade of the nineteenth, was to make India 
subservient to the industries of Great Britain, and to make the 
Indian people grow raw produce only, in order to supply material 
for the looms and manufacturies of Great Britain. (Quoted in Baran 
1962: 147). 
 
The economic history of capitalism in fact reveals that political intervention has 
always played a determining role in industrial development. In other words, 
state policies and capabilities have been of paramount importance. This is 
ignored in the present neoliberal economic discourse which focuses on “state 
failures”, i.e. political interventions in the workings of the market, which are 
considered to have been counterproductive to economic growth. To the extent 
that present neoliberalism does not accept that the state has, and has had, a 
determining role in the development of industrial capitalism, the doctrine 
remains ahistorical. On this basis, the system of politics and economics entails 
principles and beliefs claiming universal validity in the sense that any society 
following another course would do so at its own risk. These claims are related to 
an interpretation of economic history, which sees the evolution of the past two 
centuries as one long progression toward rationality and good sense. The 
milestones to this line of thinking were the publication of Adam Smith’s The 
Wealth of Nations in 1776, which theoretically laid the foundations for the case 
against precapitalist mercantilism, and the US Declaration of Independence, 
which made the case against feudalism and royal domination but underplayed 
the role of the American Revolution in the anti-colonial struggle. 
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With regard to neoliberalism, the present Anglo-American approach assumes 
almost “automatic” development as a result of the activities of individual 
economic actors rather than the deliberate strategy by a political agency. 
Consequently the unpredictability and unplannability of economies are seen as 
positive. It is noteworthy that in its 1980 World Development Report, the World 
Bank aimed at reconceptualizing the notion of development as nationally 
managed economic growth and proposing instead that from now on 
“development” be measured according to the degree of participation in and 
integration with the world market. Likewise “reform” was to be reinterpreted 
according to the extent market mechanisms were introduced (Munck 1999: 199). 
 
Late Development Versus Market Rationality 
Counterposed to this conceptual framework, economic nationalism has been 
more concerned with “market failures” both at the domestic and international 
levels. Its basic assumption is that intercourse between nations is considered to 
be a zero-sum game, i.e. some are winners and some are losers. Economics is 
consequently considered in the context of geopolitics. As a matter of fact 
economic history tends to show that industrial late-comers have indeed relied on 
internal steering of the market and society by rigging the rules of the market and 
imposing a specific utilization of the economic surplus which could lead to 
industrialization. On the international level, a certain historical pattern in late 
development can be seen for example in the United States’ efforts to catch-up 
with Britain by behaving in a manner similar to the Meiji state system and 
postwar Japan trying to catch-up with the United States. All in all it can be said 
that “politics has been in command” in leading capitalist countries. 
 
In contrast to the aversion of the neoliberal approach for interference with the 
market stands the historical school or the German school, which originated with 
Friedrich List who had learned much from his American mentor Alexander 
 10
Hamilton. According to this tradition, the logic for intervention in the workings 
of the economy is that societies left to their own devises did not automatically 
move from farming to small crafts to major industries through the numerous 
individual decisions of small merchants. This process necessitated the exercise 
of central power through a plan or incentive. List was aware that historically the 
British government had encouraged domestic manufacturing and the American 
government had discouraged foreign competitors. Reflecting on British 
protectionism, he wrote: “Not so much as a thread of (Indian cotton and silk) 
would England permit to be used. She would have none of these beautiful and 
cheap fabrics, but preferred to consume her own inferior and more costly stuffs.” 
(List 1885; Fairfield 1977: 48) 
 
In his important book The National System of Political Economy, Friedrich List 
ironically commented the lack of consistency in what he called the 
“cosmopolitan economy” of Adam Smith and the British violations of free trade. 
The interesting aspect of this dispute is that Germany by implementing some of 
the guidelines of the Listian model was able to catch-up. With regard to Japan, 
although opened by the ascending United States during its emerging imperialist 
phase, the political leadership relied on guidance from the German school rather 
than on classical or neoclassical economic thinking.  
 
By extension, the political economy offered by the theoretical contribution of 
economic nationalism of the German school has, according to some, had a more 
profound impact on the development of industrialization in Europe and East 
Asia than either Marx or Smith (Lind 1998). In the nineteenth century, the 
Listian conceptualization of late development and relation to the developed 
capitalist world had spread from Europe (including Russia) to extra-European 
countries like China, Japan, Korea and other countries while Indian nationalists 
readily drew inspiration from the same source (Szporluk 1988: 203). In the 
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1920s, a translation of List’s National System appeared in Chinese (Henderson 
1983: 217). While ultra-nationalist and fascist forces adopted the framework of 
economic nationalism, the neo-Marxist dependency school likewise implicitly 
followed in the same footsteps through its recognition of the world economy as 
a cause of underdevelopment and the recommendation of self-reliance and de-
linking.  
 
While the Listian model promoted government interference at the macro level 
especially with regard to the relationship to the outside world, (i.e. restrictive 
trading relations) and encouraging industrial investment, the New Industrialized 
Countries (the so-called NICs) in East Asia operating in a more complicated 
environment had to counteract peripheralization and structural deformation by 
establishing a strong state with economic as well as political capacities of 
steering society as well to a higher degree than the original doctrine predicted. 
Thus politics was put in command. As one development scholar put it: 
 
Neo-Listian theory explained the success of the East Asian 
countries with reference to the strategic role of the state in taming 
domestic and international forces and harnessing them to a national 
economic interest, coining the term “developmentalist state” for the 
purpose (Hoogvelt 1997: 206). 
 
Thus, the tradition of political economy known as economic nationalism was 
concerned with surmounting the hindrances to national capitalist industrial 
development in late-comer type societies through an active role of the state both 
in the mobilization of domestic resources and the protection of the national 
economic development from negative influences of international political and 
market forces. The relevance of the examples of East Asian strategies with 
regard to the problem of achieving development for Third World countries is 
evident. But the lessons have not really been incorporated in mainstream 
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development policy-making at the level of the Bretton Woods institutions such 
as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is not 
surprising given the fact that these institutions to a large extent are part of what 
is referred to as the “Washington Consensus” in critical development studies. As 
a matter of fact Friedrich List is paid little attention by the discipline of 
economics in Anglo-Saxon academia. 
 
But political intervention with the workings of capitalist market forces is not 
restricted to catching-up countries alone. As a reaction to the world depression 
of the 1930s, which to a large extent was the result of the previous 
implementation of liberal economic policies in the developed capitalist core 
nations, a retreat to nationalism took place in the form of protectionism and 
regionalism of the world economy through bloc formations around regional 
powers. The crisis contributed to the coming to power of Nazism and Fascism in 
some European countries, strengthened the strategy of “socialism in one 
country” in the USSR, while social democratic and left of center governments 
implemented Keynesian macroeconomic strategies and policies in order to 
resolve the problem of overproduction and lacking demand. While Nazism and 
Fascism were defeated during the Second World War and the Soviet Union - as 
discussed above - came out of its isolation, the social democratic project of the 
“welfare state” was established especially in Western European countries. The 
social and political pressures on the political climate in these countries during 
that period made it possible to introduce and implement social security measures 
accompanying the expansion of the public sector especially through government 
created demand for infrastructural expenditures. The period was analyzed by 
among others Karl Polanyi (1957/1944) who documented the duality and 
alternance between the political realm and market forces under advanced 
capitalism encapsulated in the notion of “double movement.”  
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Thus while both the “developmental state” and the “welfare state” reflected 
political intervention in capitalist-type economies as protective measures against 
the market mechanisms, there is a basic difference between the two. The first 
was an elitist project involving the state bureaucracy and technocracy, the 
industrialist and business sectors, and the ruling political party. The relative 
autonomy of the state was based on an undemocratic type of corporatism, which 
excluded labor representation; as a consequence the governance form took on 
the pattern of authoritarianism. In the case of the welfare state, the type of state 
was of a social democratic nature attempting to turn the economy into what has 
been called “social Marktwirtschaft” (social market). This type of corporatism 
included labor, which implied special attention to the social sector. The 
relationship to the market is therefore fundamentally divergent. While the 
Keynesian welfare state limits the social consequences of market rationality by 
implementing measures to protect weak groups, the developmentalist state curbs 
market rationality as part of an industrialization strategy with less social 
concerns. (Amsden 1992; Wade 1990). 
 
The Geopolitical Dimension 
Recognizing that the state plays an important role in both catching-up processes 
and socio-economic regulation should not be taken to imply that other elements 
can be ignored. In this respect it is necessary to bring in the ideological/political 
climate within the international political economy which existed after the 
Second World War. The examples which have been under discussion, were to a 
certain degree favored or disfavored by the confrontation between the US and 
the USSR affecting their politics of control within their so-called spheres of 
interests. Thus the East European societies were submitted to the imposition of 
socialism both from above and from the outside. Although semi-liberated from 
the capitalist world system their degree of autonomy was limited. 
 
 14
As far as East Asia was concerned, the existence of socialism in the region 
(especially China) contributed to an American strategy bent on supporting 
anticommunist states and developmental regimes. These followed policies at 
odds with the economic liberalism, which the United States was upholding but 
nevertheless accepted, by Washington. Future economic history will reveal to a 
greater degree than conventional wisdom acknowledges that the victory of the 
Chinese Revolution in 1949 played a determining role in shaping American 
foreign policy towards Japan and the rest of East Asia, including the two wars 
on the Asian mainland. (For a discussion of this question and the problems this 
created, see Hersh 1993).  
 
With regard to the European-type welfare states, the internal pressure for greater 
social security would not have been sufficient by themselves; the existence of 
the Soviet Union was a motivating factor in bringing about a compromise 
between labor and capital and the acceptance by the United States of this model 
which simultaneously proved to be quite beneficial for capitalism. In retrospect, 
the example of the welfare state and the so-called “golden age of capitalism” 
undermined the Soviet Marxist interpretation of capitalism and spread the belief 
that capitalism could be crisis-free. This furthermore accentuated the crisis of 
these societies as contacts with the West increased as a result of the policy of 
coexistence.  
 
What is being said here is that the post-World War II period was characterized 
by the existence of state formations which on the one hand were affected by the 
world economy as well as affecting it. Samir Amin enumerates three categories: 
state socialism, the post-colonial nationalist state, and the social-democratic 
welfare state, which forced accommodations on the capitalist world system. 
Their vitality was related to the preceding period which had seen the nearly 
implosion of capitalism in the 1930s and the Second World War: 
 15
None of these compromises made a complete break with the logic 
of capitalism, but all of them imposed upon capital respect for the 
movements that had resulted from the explosion of the 
contradictions of capitalism. In their unfolding, these compromises 
effectively toned down the devastating effects of economic 
alienation and polarization. But this phase is now over. 
Progressively eroded by its successes, even if partial by definition, 
this logic of compromise went down with the collapse of the system 
it had legitimated. One can only ask: Has the current return to the 
triumphalist discourse of liberalism, which believes once again in 
the end of history, only announced a tragic repetition of the earlier 
drama’s successive scenes (Amin 1996: 3). 
 
In the l990s, the “capitalist developmental state” in East Asia has been under 
siege because of internal and external economic malfunctioning. First, the crisis 
of the Japanese economy, mainly due to domestic imbalances and the “bubble 
economy” but also as a result of US pressures to increase the value of the yen 
after 1987 and to liberalize and deregulate, created an untenable situation. Then 
the East Asian financial crisis followed which conventional wisdom ascribed to 
“crony capitalism” thereby ignoring the impact of the forced liberalization of 
these countries’ previously regulated financial markets. Now that the Cold War 
was over, there is no longer any need on the part of the United States to accept 
deviations from the neoliberalist course, which is being imposed on a more or 
lesser degree under the slogan of globalization. Under these circumstances, it is 
necessary to recognize that the antagonism of neoliberalism towards political 
intervention does not limit itself to the socialist state or the capitalist welfare 
state, or the nationalist Third World State but is also directed at the East Asian 
capitalist developmental state. 
 
The Politics of Neoliberalism 
What is being implied here is that the previous strengthening and present 
weakening of the state in all these cases was the result of politics rather than the 
spontaneous workings of market mechanisms. This interpretation is given 
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credibility when we consider the formation of capitalist market economies. In 
this respect, economic anthropology is useful in establishing the evolution from 
pre-capitalism to the market economic system. Karl Polanyi (l957/1944) raises 
some interesting hypotheses as to the process involved and the results that can 
be expected from overemphasizing liberalism. One important hypothesis is that 
markets endanger social relations, i.e. the organization of social life, which 
previously had been ordered along complex and localized reciprocities, through 
monetary exchanges and contract regulation. This is not unsimilar to Marx’s 
analysis of the labor contract and the precision is intended to refute the claim of 
mainstream thinking that economic life in itself is a reflection of transactions by 
rational egotists. A second point which is more salient to the discussion of the 
relationship of individual societies to globalization, is that markets arose out of 
the activities within the realm of politics and as far as modern times are 
concerned through the agency of states. Markets are not spontaneous outcomes 
of human nature to “truck and trade” but as the outcome of political action and 
decisions carried out in a planned manner. Accordingly, the conception of a free 
market is a utopian notion since history has shown that all markets are regulated 
in the sense that their parameters and scales are established and depend on state 
institutions. The last point which is of relevance to the future prospects of 
globalization is that Polanyi’s historical analysis shows that markets can have 
such a socially disruptive nature that left to their own devices they lead either to 
socio-economic collapse or authoritarianism. As a consequence, the role of 
politics emerges as actors attempt to protect communities from the effects of the 
market either by strong anti-democratic government or the re-introduction of 
regulative measures and protective restrictions on the operations of the market 
(Scott 1997: 6-7). 
 
Some critics of globalization see it as the attempt to establish a “second free 
market utopia” conceived as a single global market by neoliberalism (ibid.). 
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However, appearances may be deceiving to the extent that there is an apparent 
paradox in the present process of dismantling political interference with the 
market at the national level while at the same time creating a structure of rules 
and regulations as well as institutions promoting liberalization and deregulation 
both at the national and international levels. In order to avoid abstract 
reductionism, it is of importance to realize that neoliberalist globalization in fact 
needs the nation-state for the political support and implementation of the 
message. In other words, the state assumes the functions of a transmission belt 
for the institutionalization of globalization. In addition, it should be recognized 
that the US government plays a determining role in promoting American 
interests in international financial institutions as exemplified during the 
management of the Mexican debt crisis and the East Asian financial crisis in 
1997. Furthermore, the personnel of these international institutions are products 
of higher educational institutions, which serve the objectives of multinational 
corporations. The structural adjustment programs directed at Third World 
countries and transitional economies of Eastern Europe and now East Asia are 
formulated with certain objectives in mind to promote certain interests in the 
better placed Western countries. But the implementation of the advice given by 
these institutions needs the cooperation and acceptance of the state apparatus of 
the recipient countries. Similarly the negotiations within the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) are carried out by state actors and necessitate their policy-
making capability in order to have the rules and regulations respected. But this 
type of negotiations is a truncated process favoring the core nations who benefit 
from the unequal balance of forces in the world economy (On the role of the 
state in facilitating neoliberal globalization, see Chesnais 1994).  
 
However, where the role of the state has indeed been reduced is within the 
public and social sectors whose functions had been to mitigate the 
malfunctioning of the capitalist system: the over-accumulation crisis, the profit 
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squeeze problems resulting from the labor/capital relationship, the 
intensification of international competition as a consequence of the tendency 
toward global overcapacity, and the massive growth of financial markets as a 
function of overproduction in the real economy and as a result of de-regulation. 
At present we see all kinds of fora where both globalization and regionalization 
of the world economy are discussed by political actors. This is evident with 
regard to the regional meetings, the GATT gatherings, and the G-7 summits 
between the members of the most powerful countries in the world. It is through 
gatherings of these nation-state politicians and representatives that the rules of 
the game for global expansion and competition are defined in order to serve the 
economic process of the world economy and the special interests of economic 
actors. Equally influential are the unofficial meetings such as the yearly World 
Economic Forum at Davos where what has been depicted as the transnational 
elite, comprising business executives, politicians and opinion makers discuss 
problems of the international economy and issue guidelines for policy-makers. 
 
The Transition from State-Socialism to Capitalism 
It is with the realization of the importance of politics in mind present in the 
hidden discourse of neoliberalism and the so-called process of globalization that 
the evolution of former socialist societies should to be considered. The balance-
sheet of the transformation which has taken place in Russia and Eastern Europe 
is not as positive as expected at the time of the demise of the so-called 
“command economies”. Russia has not moved from a situation of being on the 
verge of collapse (economic, political and social) with the prospect of 
disintegration and renewed internal. Despite the “assistance” of the West in the 
form of IMF loans, what has been attained is a kind of “kleptocracy - 
capitalism.” As a Russian economist puts it: “What is certain is that the parasitic 
character of the new Russian capitalism is even more pronounced than that of 
the predecessors. Not a single important new plant or factory has been built in 
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Russia in the last eight years. The economy is operating exclusively by utilizing 
productive capacity created under socialism.” (Menshikov 1999: 82). This is 
interesting to the extent that the political and economic elites are not interested 
in anything other than enriching themselves at the expense of the wealth created 
under the socialist system. These endeavors are not in contradiction with the 
interests of the West who is not really interested in the emergence of strong 
economies with the potential of autonomous development. As an economic 
analyst has pointed out:  
 
The IMF-style “shock treatment” initiated in January 1992 
precluded from the outset a transition towards “national 
capitalism”, -- i.e. a national capitalist economy owned and 
controlled by a Russian entrepreneurial class and supported as in 
other major capitalist nations by the economic and social policies of 
the state. For the West, the enemy was not “socialism” but 
capitalism (Chossudovsky 1997: 225). 
 
In addition to the deterioration of socio-economic and political conditions for 
the population, the country’s national pride has been humiliated by the West 
during various international conflicts in the past few years; last but not least with 
the marginalization of Moscow during the Kosovo conflict.  
 
In the case of the Eastern European countries, the results of transition have been 
uneven and problematic. Even a country like Hungary with the highest degree of 
market activity and a relatively larger share of the foreign investment inflows to 
the region has seen its industrial production fall substantially. The dilemma for 
Eastern European nations is that they have reneged on their past experience with 
state socialism without taking into consideration the implementation of 
developmentalist state strategies in order to surmount their difficulties. The 
political elites often uncritically adopted the neoliberalist discourse on economic 
policy-making without coming to term with the realization that it may be 
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truncated. In doing so they have thrown out the baby with the water by viewing 
the legacies of the previous system as liabilities. Regardless of what critics say, 
these societies had, however, not been unmitigated failures. High educational 
levels had been achieved, basic human needs guaranteed, and essential physical 
infrastructure constructed and maintained. One has to be aware of the large 
differentiations between the different Eastern European countries with regard to 
their histories, demographic situations, and physical resources; also their record 
on economic reforms and transition towards a market economy has varied. But 
as a general statement it can be said that ideological and political reasoning has 
determined their adoption of anti-statist and anti-institutionalist policies in 
contrast to the East Asian experience with capitalism. In the words of a team of 
institutional economists working on these questions: 
 
A critical difference between the classic capitalism that the Eastern 
Europeans have tried to promote and the late-industrial capitalism 
that the East Asians have pioneered lies in the role of institutions in 
shaping the form, substance, direction, and pace of economic 
expansion. In the East European case, the role of institutions has 
been minimal; resource allocation has been left almost entirely to 
the market mechanism (Amsden, Kochanowic, Taylor 1994: 2). 
 
In this context it would be shortsighted to see the evolution of Eastern European 
countries exclusively through the prism of purely internal dynamics. What has 
been happening is that this process was complementary to the global discourse 
which emerged during the 1980s whereby major powers and financial capital 
promoted economic liberalization on the premise that states had acquired too 
much control of economies during the stagflationary period of the 1970s in the 
capitalist world. The convergence between external influences and internal 
trends is well described by a political scientist writing on this dynamics which 
also played an important role in the decomposition of Yugoslavia: 
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The West’s euphoria over the collapse of communist states and its 
insistence on market reform, privatization, and slashed budgets as 
conditions for economic aid and trade paid little regard to the 
alternative hypotheses –that the crisis of these countries grew from 
governments that were too weak; that to achieve the prescribed 
measures required an extremely effective administrative capacity; 
that foreign creditors will lend only to governments that guarantee 
repayment; and that foreign investors demand favorable 
governmental regulations and political stability (Woodward 
1995:16). 
 
Another factor influencing the general trend towards neoliberalism especially in 
the Western dominated international financial institutions and their strong 
influence on Eastern Europe was related to the implicit fear of the rise of a 
strong and competitive form of state capitalism in East Asia:  
 
At the time the East European transition began, those organizations 
(the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and World Bank) were 
themselves in the grips of a strong neoconservatism stemming from 
the United States’s crisis of self-confidence. In reaction to the rise 
of the East Asian late-industrializers, American and hence Bretton 
Woods policies exaggerated the virtues of free markets and, by 
means of the conditions that the World Bank and IMF attached to 
their loans, limited Eastern Europe’s policy menu. Eastern Europe 
has thus been assigned a place in the international economy roughly 
comparable to what it occupied in earlier centuries: that of a poor 
cousin in the division of labor with the rest of Europe (Amsden, 
Kochanowicz, Taylor 1994: 5). 
 
It seems that the lessons of historical and modern capitalism have been forgotten 
in most countries implementing the transition from state socialism to market 
economies. What needs to be learned is that capitalism has to be considered 
from both an international political economy angle as well as from an economic 
theoretical understanding. Thus, how the international system influences the 
evolution of the units in the world capitalist structure as well as how markets 
have been politically constructed and maintained. The theoretical reminder of 
Karl Polanyi concerning the experience of Western Europe with capitalism 
 22
should not be dismissed: “The road to the free market was opened and kept open 
by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled 
interventionism.” (Polanyi l957/1944: 140). The importance of this 
interpretation was confirmed by the relative successful economic catching-up of 
the East Asian NICs as well as the transition by socialist countries like Vietnam 
and especially China towards market reforms. While Eastern Europe has 
followed a model which is close to the teachings of Adam Smith, the NICs 
relied more on economic nationalism involving an opposite approach to 
capitalism both with regard to the internal social structure of capital 
accumulation and the international division of labor and world economic 
structure than neoliberalism recommends. The above quoted team of economists 
put this difference in the following way: 
 
The Eastern Europeans have faithfully followed a model that would 
have been familiar to Adam Smith. The approach of the successful 
late-industrializers, however, represent something distinct: it has 
been capitalist in orientation yet a significant departure from either 
textbook theory or eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Anglo-
American capitalist norms. (Amsden, Kochanowicz, Taylor 1994: 
3) 
 
This is where the market reform movement which has taken place in China, 
offers some valuable lessons for students of transition from a command-type 
economic system to a market-guided one in a context of late development comes 
in. This transition is of course without precedent and there are no blueprints on 
the methods to be applied. In the Eastern European context and the Russian 
example, the overthrow of the former state socialism has been radical especially 
at the ideological, political and economic levels. It is as if these countries, 
instead of searching for societal innovation in order to catch-up to the richest 
countries, tried to implement a strategy which was congruent with their selective 
historical memory and the mythologies of the paragons of neoliberalism. 
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The Challenge of Chinese “Market Socialism” 
In comparison to these examples, China’s polity has to a greater degree retained 
the initiative. In contrast to Russia and Eastern Europe, China distanced itself 
from these post-socialist transformations to the extent that the country officially 
remains committed to some form of socialism. The concept of “market 
socialism” which was launched under the economic reform movement by the 
Dengist leadership reflects some ambivalence within the CCP towards the 
notion of making use of capitalist measures to construct socialism. Compared to 
the rapid deconstruction of the socialist structures under the impact of 
liberalization and marketization of the former command economies in Eastern 
Europe and Russia, one can interpret the Chinese approach as a radical strategy 
of change but with tactical moderation. While the other transformations and 
adaptations to globalization rejected the past, the political elite in China did not 
wish, or could not, implement a complete break with the legacy of the central 
planning economic system without calling forth immediate resistance. 
 
While the rupture with the former socio-economic system in the Eastern 
European and Russian context took place almost simultaneously within the 
political sphere (glasnost) and the economic sphere (perestroika), in the Chinese 
case economic reforms were introduced first while political reforms were not 
given the same priority. The political reforms led to a loss of political control 
with adverse effect on economic restructuring in both Eastern Europe and 
Russia; in China, the process of economic reforms was maintained under the 
political control of the state/party authority. The consequences of the choice of 
option are of importance as the sequencing of the implementation of reforms 
plays an influential role. In the case of the countries that adopted political 
reforms first, their experience has shown definite shortcomings. These countries 
have neither achieved sustainable political stability nor viable economic success. 
The continuous turmoil in Russia (including the menace of national 
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disintegration) and the deterioration of the economy are interconnected with 
very little sign of improvement. The conditions in Eastern Europe are not quite 
as bad, but this may be ascribed to the attention and investment of Western 
capital. China, in contrast, has enjoyed rapid economic growth under a one-party 
type of political system and limited democracy. 
 
In order to explain the disparity between these examples, the history of China is 
certainly a factor to take into consideration; the experience of the past both on 
the internal level and the relationship to the external world created a latent 
nationalist constituency which has been conscious of the country’s position and 
role. The ambition of the Chinese leadership is thus not only one of establishing 
an economy which can create development and industrialization and the 
provision of employment for the expanding labor force as well as raising the 
living standard of the people, but there is awareness in the political sphere that 
China cannot rely on outside advice or assistance. Given its geographical 
location, China was able to observe at close hand the evolution of the East Asian 
NICs who under authoritarian regimes were able to muster the market 
mechanisms in the direction of industrialization and improve their positions in 
the international division of labor. On the other hand, another external influence 
on the Chinese political elite has been the experience of observing, probably 
with consternation, the meltdown of the former Soviet economy and social 
fabric as well as the deterioration of the international position of Russia. 
 
Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether the lessons of the evolution of the 
outside world have been digested by the Chinese political elite and translated 
into strategic thinking. Concerning the Asian NICs, it is a fact that the 
willingness of the United States to accept the guided market model and the 
economic nationalism of these countries was related to Cold War considerations. 
Now that the socialist menace has also dissipated in the Asian region, the US is 
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becoming less tolerant of deviations from its own brand of capitalism and the 
neoliberalist discourse. This means that the international climate for the export-
oriented model of catching-up, which these countries utilized, is reaching the 
end of the road. From now on the United States is getting readied to be more 
aggressive in its geoeconomic dealings with these countries. The way 
Washington influenced the IMF in the resolution of the financial crisis of Asian 
countries in 1997 showed that American interests are given predominance in 
what has become a unipolar world. Can China hope to get special treatment 
from its dealings with the United States? The two countries have different 
agendas and the non-recognition of these contradictions will only lead to 
tensions in the future. The days of the tacit US-Sino anti-Soviet alliance are 
gone! 
 
While China strives to catch-up to the level of the highly developed capitalist 
societies, it is unavoidable that such a prospect is causing nervousness in the 
Western capitals of the world. According to World System Analysis, countries 
have been able to move from the periphery to the semiperiphery or core status 
and vice-versa during historical capitalism. Presently, there is limited space in 
the core category and the emergence of a powerful proto-capitalist economy in 
China would be much more of a threat to the capitalist world system than a self-
reliant and isolated socialist China would have been. Viewed as a zero-sum 
game with winners and losers, the capitalist centers in the world cannot but look 
with apprehension at the evolution of China. Accordingly, both seen from a 
Realpolitik perspective as well as from an international political economy 
perspective, the integration of a united and powerful China is seen as a source of 
disorder. As expressed by a scholar writing on the possibility of rivalry in the 
international system puts it: 
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One may say that the falling apart of China is a precondition for the 
integration of (large parts of) China into the world market, because 
neither China nor the world market could stand the integration of 
all of China at the same time. (Junne 1999: 106) 
 
The Chinese problem has been a question which already preoccupied Western 
imperialism in the 19th century. What was to be done with the sleeping giant 
was discussed especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. The enticing opportunities 
as well as the fears of conflict fuelled the Open Door policy of dividing China 
into spheres of influence in order to divide benefits between the imperialist 
nations and prevent the emergence of a strong united China. (For an analysis of 
these issues written l00 years ago see: “The Break-Up of China, and Our Interest 
in It” The Atlantic Monthly, August 1899). This question is still of actuality and 
seems to be encompassing other nations as well. Observing what has been 
happening to Yugoslavia as well as to Russia, it is not entirely far-fetched to 
conclude that the existing state structure of countries cannot be taken for 
granted. While profit-seeking economic actors might not be as concerned with 
inter-state relations, the geopolitical dimension of the world capitalist system 
emphasizes the salience of internal socio-economic and political developments 
in countries which can be a challenge to the existing world order under 
American hegemony. This is where the importance of Chinese “market-
socialism” comes in.  
 
Does the strategy behind this concept aim at integrating a strong China in the 
world system, then specific attention needs to be given to the viability and 
strengthening of the domestic society. While the “socialist” dimension of the 
equation aims at securing the cohesiveness of the political and social system 
internally, the “market” dimension aims at projecting China in the world 
economy and world system of nation states while simultaneously demanding 
adjustment to mechanisms which weaken the societal cohesiveness. This creates 
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a lopsidedness in the political system and the question arises whether it is the 
political sphere that controls the market like a “bird in the cage”, or whether it is 
the market that directs the party and the state. In the latter case, the results could 
be the utilization of authoritarian political structures of the Communist legacy 
combined with rather brutal socio-economic injustices of capitalism. As the 
American Marxist Bertell Ollman puts it: “Leaving most market mystification in 
place, market socialism cannot be viewed as just another form of socialism, or 
even a compromise with capitalism. It is a surrender to capitalism which for 
historical reasons continues to fly the socialist flag.” (Ollman 1998: 112). 
 
It is possible that the post-Maoist market reforms can lead to an upsurge of 
economic growth as China in fact experienced during the 1990s. Though a far-
fetched prediction, some analysts go as far as to anticipate that the Chinese 
economy will become the world’s largest economy by the year 2015. While the 
economic growth rate has thus been dynamic, the social results have not been 
very encouraging. Influenced by the reformist trends in Eastern Europe and 
Russia in the 1970s and 1980s as well as the successes of the Asian NICs the 
Dengist leadership did not aim at abandoning socialism’s emphasis on the 
maintenance of the political primacy of the Communist Party and control of the 
“commanding heights of the economy.” In other words, this perspective 
considered that capitalism was not necessarily an ”organic whole” and that the 
material gains could be separated from bourgeois society and culture. As the 
Sinologist Maurice Meisner who makes this point, argues “… the most general 
and historically far-reaching result of market reform has been the construction of 
a capitalist economy that now functions in accordance with its own logic.” 
(Meisner 1999: 246).  
 
Although the Chinese leadership still clings to the claim of socialist legitimacy 
and relies on a nationalist discourse, the unfolding of the economy reveals more 
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and more capitalist traits and shortcomings. The socio-economic system is thus 
characterized by wage labor which, although not entirely new, is becoming 
overwhelming; the country is becoming more and more integrated into the world 
capitalist economy (and its institutions, i.e. The World Trade Organization) with 
the latter becoming determinant in forcing the domestic Chinese economy to 
adapt to the rules set by the core nations; profit making has been generalized at 
the enterprise level and the economic life of the country; the labor force has 
become commodified through the policy of “smashing the iron rice bowl” in the 
countryside creating a reserve army of unemployed calculated to be around 200 
million (including the so-called “floating population”); the promotion of 
entrepreneurship has had the effect of generating a new bourgeoisie who is 
becoming a social agent of capitalist development; new values have also seen 
the light which stress individualism at the expense of the collectivity. As 
Maurice Meisner puts it: 
 
With the maturation of these policies in the early 1990s, especially 
the creation of a new bourgeoisie (albeit one with a strong 
bureaucratic component) and a labor market, China has had a 
flourishing capitalist market economy that functions largely within 
the norms that govern capitalism in general. (Meisner 1999: 242). 
 
In this process, the social and political base of the CCP and its leadership is 
changing from the former laboring classes (workers and peasants) adhering to 
the socialist perspective to a still weak nationalist middle class. In other words, a 
rupture in slow motion with the Marxist project of socialism to the adoption of 
the Listian capitalist pattern of economic nationalism. Writing on the different 
social constellations in the two political projects, Roman Szporluk puts it in the 
following terms: 
 
What the proletariat – armed with the doctrine of “scientific 
socialism” – was to Marx, the modern intelligentsia – the 
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intellectuals, technocrats, scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals 
and white collar workers – were to List. (Szporluk 1988: 145) 
 
The class alliance, which the notion of “market socialism” entails, will thus have 
to satisfy at least two types of constituencies. The working classes being made to 
feel the pains of market reforms while segments of the emerging middle class 
are becoming disenchanted with the pace of political liberalization. Increasing 
integration in the world economy will submit the political leadership of China to 
further pressures and criticism with regard to both economic and political 
reforms. 
 
Due to the size of its economy and size of the country, the modernization of 
China cannot but influence the evolution of the world. As discussed above, 
should China become an economic powerhouse this would impact on the 
structure of the international system forcing to find a way of dealing with it. A 
full-scale Chinese industrialization and integration in the world economy would 
be a destabilizing factor in the world balance of power both economically and 
politically. On the other hand, the failure of modernization through “market 
socialism” plunging the country into chaos and civil strife, would likewise 
represent a menace to the stability of the region as well as to the rest of the 
world. As an observer of the Asian scene who argues along those lines put it: 
“Either way, it is the dragon - not the East Asian tigers or the Japanese goose or 
the American eagle - that will spell the future of the Pacific Rim.” (Aseniero 
1996: 193). 
 
     * * * * * * * * * 
 
In this paper the focus has been put on the significance of politics in the 
establishment of capitalism at both the domestic and the international levels. 
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While neoclassical economics assume that the market is an autonomous self-
regulating arena, the paper has discussed the importance of the state behind the 
creation of conditions for the functioning of the market economy. The 
breakdown of socialist-type systems and the transition towards market 
economies has likewise been a political process and not the spontaneous 
unfolding of capitalist forms of economic arrangements. The world economy 
played a certain role of attracting these countries in the direction of integrating 
the world system; but this has not been a purely economic evolution as political 
influences have also been at work.  
 
An interesting question with regard to the evolution of the capitalist world 
system is whether globalization represents a qualitative break with the mode of 
functioning of historical capitalism. Such a rupture would imply that it is easier 
now for nations of the periphery to access the category of the core. Put in 
another way: Does globalization open up for catching-up? 
 
The argument can be made that by imposing neoliberalism as a discourse, 
ideology and practice, the core –through control of the five monopolies—aims at 
maintaining the division of the world in its present shape. Thus the weakening of 
the state in the periphery – which is the actor who historically played the 
primordial role in the economic development of industrial capitalism—becomes 
an implicit method for maintaining the countries of the Third World in a 
position of subservience and dependency relative to the core.  
 
The advice of international financial institutions to the post-socialist political 
elites of transitional societies has also represented the interests of the hegemonic 
structure dominated by the United States. This was the case not only in Eastern 
Europe and Russia who implemented the IMF’s so-called “shock therapy,” but 
also the developmental states in East Asia were weakened through application of 
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adjustment programs following the financial crisis of 1997. The political aim of 
the measures, which were taken in collaboration with recommendations of the 
US Treasury Department, were to pry open these economies to the interests of 
Western financial and productive capital. In this regard a conclusion which can 
be reached is that globalization is not a purely economic process within the 
world economy but the result of the imposition of neoliberalism on countries 
through the establishment of rules and regulations determined to a large extent 
by the core countries of the world system especially as a function of the political 
influence and strength of the hegemonic power, the United States. 
 
What we experience at this time is not the end of history as claimed by Francis 
Fukuyama, but the beginning of a new era where countries will have to adjust to 
the dictate of the only superpower in the world or resist and attempt to establish 
social/economic/and political structures enabling them to protect their interests. 
The history of world capitalism and its hierarchical structure show that the 
system is not one that establishes harmony and stability but that conflictual 
relationships arise. Catching-up or the establishment of alternative socio-
economic systems demand special attention on the part of the polity in the 
concerned countries. Accepting the dominant ideological influence of 
neoliberalism which stresses the blessings of the market is neither a recipe for 
advancement in the world system nor creating harmonious social relations. In 
the end game, the menaces of such a structure is beginning to be realized even 
within circles of the international business elite. Thus the financier George Soros 
writing before the Asian financial crisis in the summer of 1997 warned of the 
consequences of generalized neoliberalism: 
 
I now fear that the untrammeled intensification of laissez-faire 
capitalism and the spread of market values into all areas of life is 
endangering our open and democratic society. The main enemy of 
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the open society, I believe, is no longer communist but the capitalist 
threat (Soros 1997: 45). 
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